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have affected the rules and means by which lawyers practice law and certain 
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advancements.  Topics examined include: (1) the ways by which electronic 
communication has increased the potential for the attorney–client privilege 
to be waived and the resulting impact on the present-day practice of law; 
(2) the effect of social media on lawyers’ ethical obligations, including 
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own use of social media; and (3) the impact of cloud computing on a 
lawyer’s obligation to protect client confidences.  The authors examine the 
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Rules of Professional Conduct, and state ethics opinions and representative 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technological advancements continue to revolutionize the way modern 
communication takes place and the way in which people access and utilize 
information.  Such advancements impact almost all industries.  The practice 
of law is no exception.  Lawyers and law firms now communicate with each 
other and with clients by electronic means, utilize mobile devices, maintain 
electronic files, and even store client information “in the cloud.”  While new 
technologies provide lawyers and law firms with faster and more efficient 
means to practice law, they present new challenges for lawyers and law firms 
to comply with their ethical obligations.  In many instances, the ethical rules 
that govern lawyers were developed prior to the implementation of new 
technologies that have since become commonplace in other areas of life.  
Indeed, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed the “Commission on 
Ethics 20/20”1 in 2009, which recognizes that “[t]echnological advances and 
 
 1. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, A.B.A, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Dec. 19, 
2016) (“The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was created by then ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm 
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globalization have changed our profession in ways not yet reflected in our 
ethics codes and regulatory structure.”2 
This Article examines how certain technological developments have 
affected ethics in the practice of law.  Part I discusses on the impact of 
technology on the concept of attorney–client privilege and the resulting 
ethical implications.  Part II focuses on ethical issues that arise with the use 
of social media, including the use of social media by clients and by lawyers.  
Part III focuses on the obligations of lawyers to protect client confidences 
when using new technology, with an emphasis on the use of cloud 
computing.3 
II. TECHNOLOGY AND THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
While technological developments have provided lawyers and their 
clients with an increased ability to communicate with each other, those 
developments also allow for increased opportunities for third parties to gain 
access to communications between a lawyer and a client.  Consequently, 
communication by electronic means carries with it the greater potential for 
the attorney–client privilege not to attach to communications between a 
lawyer and a client in the first place or for the privilege to be waived.  This 
Section examines the means by which the attorney–client privilege can fail 
to attach or be waived by the use of modern technology and the resulting 
implication on a lawyer’s ethical obligations. 
The attorney–client privilege protects communications between an 
attorney and client “for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
assistance for the client.”4  Confidential communications are those that are 
“not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than in the course of 
rendering legal services to the client or transmitting the communications by 
reasonably necessary means.”5 
 
to perform a thorough review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the U.S. system 
of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in technology and global legal practice developments.”).  
 2.  Michael E. Lackey Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweeting, 
Facebooking and Blogging, 28 TOURO L. REV. 149, 154 (2012) (quoting Press Release, ABA, ABA 
President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Comm’n to Address Tech. and Global Practice Challenges 
Facing U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009)).   
 3.  Unless noted otherwise, references herein to the “Rules of Professional Conduct” or a 
particular rule of professional conduct refer to the current American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
 4.  In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
 5.  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Coal., 178 F.R.D. 61, 66 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d in part, 
modified in part, 178 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Va. 1998); see also United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874 
n.6 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating the Supreme Court Standard 503(a)(4) is “[a confidential] 
communication . . . not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure 
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The work–product doctrine, the “inseparable twin” to the attorney–client 
privilege, protects a lawyer’s “mental impressions, opinions, and/or legal 
theories concerning litigation.”6  In United States v. Nobles,7 the Supreme 
Court of the United States recognized that the work–product doctrine 
protects not only materials prepared by an attorney, but also those prepared 
by agents for an attorney.8  This recognition was grounded in the fact that 
“attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents 
in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial.”9  Although the 
work–product doctrine is a separate concept from the attorney–client 
privilege, the same principles recognized by the Nobles Court also apply to 
the attorney–client privilege.10 
With the advent of modern technology and the use of new technologies 
in the practice of law, lawyers are now employing agents for new and 
previously unforeseen purposes, such as storing client files “in the cloud.”  
Recognizing the new purposes for which technology providers are being 
utilized, the ABA amended the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 
2012 “to reflect the changing role of technology in legal practice and 
specifically recognized the need for reliance on such technology providers 
in supplying legal services.”11  For example, Comment 3 to Model Rule 5.3, 
which generally governs a lawyer’s responsibility to oversee non-lawyer 
assistants of all kinds, now includes the following language: 
A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering 
legal services to the client.  Examples include the retention of an investigative 
or paraprofessional service, hiring a document management company to 
create and maintain a database for complex litigation, sending client 
documents to a third party for printing or scanning, and using an Internet-
 
is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communication”).   
 6.  NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 7.  United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). 
 8.  Id. at 238 (“It is therefore necessary that the [work-product] doctrine protect 
material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney 
himself.”).  
 9.  Id. 
 10. Fed. Election Comm’n, 178 F.R.D. at 66 (listing the requirements for a document to be 
protected under attorney–client privilege). 
 11. Troutman Sanders LLP, Breaking the Seal: Does Using Third Party eDiscovery Vendors Raise Privilege 
and Work Product Issues?, INFO. INTERSECTION (July 17, 2014), http://www.
informationintersection.com/2014/07/breaking-the-seal-does-using-third-party-ediscovery-vendors-
raise-privilege-and-work-product-issues/.   
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based service to store client information.12 
However, the way in which technology providers are now being used to 
assist lawyers and law firms necessitates an examination of the concept of 
attorney–client privilege and confidentiality in the digital age.  Consistent 
with Nobles, the attorney–client privilege will extend to protect otherwise 
privileged communications where a lawyer or a law firm shares those 
communications with a vendor deemed necessary to facilitate the 
representation.13  Thus, a law firm generally will not be deemed to have 
waived information protected by the attorney–client privilege by 
“contracting with an independent contractor . . . to provide a necessary 
service that the law firm feels it needs in order to effectively represent its 
clients.”14 
While a law firm’s legitimate use of technology providers to assist in its 
practice may not jeopardize the attorney–client privilege, a client’s decision 
to use certain technology, in connection with that client’s communications 
with counsel, might be more precarious.15  For example, under certain 
circumstances, a client or potential client’s communications with a lawyer or 
potential lawyer by e-mail may not be protected by the attorney–client 
privilege.16  Generally, e-mail communications between an attorney and 
client or potential client will be protected by attorney–client privilege, so 
long as the communication was for the purpose of securing legal assistance 
or advice.17  However, that may not be the case where the client utilizes an 
e-mail account or computer belonging to their employer. 
In Holmes v. Petrovich Development Corp.,18 an employee’s (Ms. Holmes) e-
mail communications with counsel were found to not be protected by the 
attorney–client privilege.  The employee, who filed suit against her employer 
for sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, violation of her 
 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 13. Id. (“When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate 
directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s 
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”). 
 14. Compulit v. Banctec, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 410, 412 (W.D. Mich. 1997).   
 15. See Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1047 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
an employee’s e-mail communications with her attorney using her employer’s computer are not 
protected by attorney–client privilege). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Wultz v. Bank of China, 979 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“‘In order to prevail 
on an assertion of the attorney–client privilege the party invoking the privilege’ must show [they sought 
the communication with the lawyer] . . . ‘for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on 
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding . . . .’” (quoting Colton v. United 
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962))). 
 18. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev.Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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right to privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, had used 
the employer’s company computer to e-mail an attorney regarding her 
potential claims.19  The court determined that the communications between 
Ms. Holmes and her attorney were not privileged because they were not 
confidential communications.20  Under the circumstances, the 
communications were not transmitted in a manner protected from 
disclosure to third persons other than those necessary to further the interest 
of the client.21  Although privileged communications do not lose their 
privileged character by virtue of the fact that they were sent by e-mail, the 
court concluded that such communications are not privileged where:  
(1) . . . the electronic means used belongs to the defendant; (2) the defendant 
has advised the plaintiff that communications using electronic means are not 
private, may be monitored, and may be used only for business purposes; and 
(3) the plaintiff is aware of and agrees to these conditions.22   
Because Ms. Holmes used the company computer, knowing that this use 
violated company computer policy and that they could be discovered due to 
company monitoring of e-mail use, Ms. Holmes’ e-mails were “akin to 
consulting her lawyer in her employer’s conference room, in a loud voice, 
with the door open, so that any reasonable person would expect that their 
discussion of her complaints about her employer would be overheard by 
him.”23 
Further, Ms. Holmes’ subjective belief that her e-mail communications 
with her attorney were private did not alter the result.  Ms. Holmes believed 
the communications were “private because she utilized a private password 
to use the company computer and she deleted the e-mails after they were 
sent.”24  However, the company’s e-mail policy made that belief objectively 
unreasonable.25Ms. Holmes was “warned that the company would monitor 
e-mail to ensure employees were complying with office policy not to use 
company computers for personal matters, and she was told that she had no 
expectation of privacy in any messages she sent via the company 
computer.”26  Additionally, Ms. Holmes’ belief that the company did not, 
 
 19. Id. at 1056. 
 20. Id. at 1068. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1069. 
 24. Id. at 1069. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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in reality, monitor e-mail in accordance with the written policy did not alter 
the analysis.  The court stated that “[a]bsent a company communication to 
employees explicitly contradicting the company’s warning to them that 
company computers are monitored to make sure employees are not using 
them to send personal e-mail, it is immaterial that the ‘operational reality’ is 
the company does not actually do so.”27  Such an “operational reality” 
scenario was seen as an unreasonable belief on the part of the employee, 
analogous to one believing that he or she is able to exceed a speed limit with 
impunity merely because a particular roadway is seldom patrolled.28 
In a slightly different fact pattern, Marina Stengart (Ms. Stengart) filed an 
employment discrimination lawsuit against her employer, Loving Care 
Agency, Inc. (Loving Care).29  In anticipation of discovery, Loving Care 
hired a computer forensic expert to recover files stored on the company-
issued laptop Ms. Stengart used while employed at Loving Care.30  Among 
the files stored on that laptop were e-mails Ms. Stengart had exchanged with 
her attorney.31  Although Ms. Stengart sent and received those e-mails by 
her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account, and did not 
use her company e-mail account, the company-issued laptop had 
automatically saved the e-mails to its hard drive.32  While she did not intend 
for copies of the e-mails to be saved, default settings on the Internet 
browser, unbeknownst to her, automatically saved copies of her browsing 
sessions while she used her personal e-mail account.33  In contrast with 
Holmes, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately determined that the e-
mails between Ms. Stengart and her attorney were protected by the 
attorney–client privilege and that the privilege had not been waived.34 
Loving Care’s employee handbook noted that the company “reserves and 
will exercise the right to review, audit, intercept, access, and disclose all 
matters on the company’s media systems and services at any time, with or 
without notice.”35  Loving Care contended that the language of the policy 
precluded its employees from having an expectation of privacy in their use 
of Loving Care’s computers.36  The court, however, noted that it was not 
 
 27. Id. at 1071. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010).   
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 655–56. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 655. 
 35. Id. at 657. 
 36. Id. at 658. 
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clear whether the policy covered an employee’s use of personal, password-
protected, web-based e-mail because the policy did not address personal e-
mail accounts.37  Therefore, employees did “not have express notice that 
messages sent or received on a personal, web-based e-mail account [were] 
subject to monitoring if company equipment [was] used to access the 
account.”38  The policy also did not provide notice that such e-mails would 
be stored on the company computer’s hard drive.39  The court ultimately 
determined that Ms. Stengart had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
e-mails exchanged with her attorney.40  First, Ms. Stengart had a subjective 
expectation of privacy, because she took steps to protect the privacy of the 
e-mails by using a personal, password-protected e-mail account and did not 
save her account password on the company computer.41  Her expectation 
of privacy was found to be objectively reasonable because Loving Care’s 
policy did not address the use of private, web-based e-mails and did not 
inform employees that Loving Care could retrieve these e-mails.42  Thus, 
the e-mails were protected by the attorney–client privilege.43 
The takeaway from Holmes and Stengart is that the language of an 
employer’s policy is instrumental in determining whether the attorney–client 
privilege will attach to communications between an employee and an 
attorney when such communications are sent or received using the 
employer’s equipment.  The language of the policy will likely determine 
whether the employee’s subjective expectation of privacy is objectively 
reasonable.  In Stengart, the court concluded that the language of the policy 
did not give Ms. Stengart “cause to anticipate that Loving Care would be 
peering over her shoulder as she opened e-mails from her lawyer on her 
personal, password-protected Yahoo account.”44  Therefore, the court 
implied that had the policy provided Ms. Stengart with notice that Loving 
Care would “peer over her shoulder,” her expectation of privacy might not 
have been objectively reasonable.45  Thus, under circumstances where 
company policy provides clear notice regarding e-mail usage, such as the 
notice provided in Holmes, it is crucial that employees not use company e-
 
 37. Id. at 659. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 663. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 664. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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mail to communicate with their attorneys.46 
Lawyers rarely know, however, the content of the employer policies that 
might govern a client’s use of an employer-issued computer, smartphone, 
or tablet computer, or even the current state of the law on the interpretation 
of those policies in jurisdictions whose law might apply.47  Of course, it 
follows that lawyers representing clients who regularly use technology 
belonging to others must consider advising their clients about the risks 
involved, and more importantly, should seriously consider having a 
conversation with clients about how and with what technology they will 
communicate about any confidential or sensitive matters.48  Some 
lawyers—especially perhaps older lawyers—may find it strange that a lawyer 
today should think about and actually discuss with a client at the outset of 
representation what technology they will use to communicate, but having 
such a conversation is becoming more important with each new change in 
the technologies clients and lawyers use.49 
Ethics opinions also point lawyers in this direction.50  ABA Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.1 requires an attorney to provide competent 
representation to a client and ABA Model Rule 1.6 requires an attorney to 
protect the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of a 
client.51  Because the attorney–client privilege might not attach to electronic 
communications sent or received using an employer’s computer, the ABA 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has 
concluded that ABA Model Rules 1.1 and 1.6 require an attorney to warn a 
 
 46. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1068 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (clarifying 
the use of e-mail to communicate with an attorney falls under the attorney–client privilege unless “the 
electronic means used belongs to the defendant[,] the defendant has advised the plaintiff that 
communications using electronic means are not private . . . [and] the plaintiff is aware of and agrees to 
these conditions”). 
 47. Jonathan Levy, Note, Employee E-Mails and the Concept of Earning the Privilege, J. L. & POL’Y FOR 
INFO. SOC’Y 245, 247 (2013) (“Courts addressing the applicability of the attorney–client privilege to 
employees who communicate with their attorneys via e-mail on an employer’s computer have come 
up with a variety of conclusions.”). 
 48. See Holmes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 1056 (recounting a situation where an attorney advised 
against the use of client’s work computer for attorney–client communications from the beginning of 
the consultation and proposed a conversation over the phone instead). 
 49. See Steven Masur, Confidentiality in a High-Tech World, GP SOLO (July/Aug. 2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_
magazine_index/confidentiality.html (noting the potential risk of inadvertent disclosure of a client’s 
confidential information “[i]n our era of virtual offices, shared office spaces, and the continuing tide 
of ever-evolving technologies”). 
 50. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) (discussing the 
attorney’s duty to protect the confidentiality of e-mail communication with clients). 
 51. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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client regarding the client’s use of e-mail in appropriate circumstances.52  
The Committee stated that: 
A lawyer sending or receiving substantive communications with a client via e-
mail or other electronic means ordinarily must warn the client about the risk 
of sending or receiving electronic communications using a computer or other 
device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant risk that a third party 
may gain access.  In the context of representing an employee, this obligation 
arises, at the very least, when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that the client is likely to send or receive substantive client-lawyer 
communications via e-mail or other electronic means, using a business device 
or system under circumstances where there is a significant risk that the 
communications will be read by the employer or another third party.53 
Regardless of whether such communications are legally protected by 
attorney–client privilege in the relevant jurisdiction, the Committee 
determined that: 
[A] lawyer should . . . advise [an] employee-client “about the importance of 
communicating with the lawyer in a manner that protects the confidentiality 
of email communications, just as a lawyer should avoid speaking face-to-face 
with a client about sensitive matters if the conversation might be overheard 
and should warn the client against discussing their communications with 
others.”54 
The warning becomes necessary because of the risk that such 
communications will be reviewed by others or found to be admissible in 
judicial proceedings.55  Consistent with workplace realities today, the 
Committee observed that, unless a lawyer has reason to believe otherwise, a 
lawyer “ordinarily should assume that an employer’s internal policy allows 
for access to the employee’s e-mails sent to or from a workplace device or 
system.”56 
Although the employee-client is the predominant scenario, it is not the 
only circumstance under which a lawyer’s ethical obligations may require a 
lawyer to warn a client about the use of electronic communications.  Any 
time there is a risk that a client might send or receive attorney–client 
communications from a device or account to which a third party may gain 
 
 52. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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access, such an ethical obligation will arise.  Consider, for example, the client 
engaged in divorce proceedings who shares a home computer or iPad with 
other family members or the client in a business dispute with a partner who 
might use the business’ e-mail system for e-mail communications.  The 
Committee concluded that: 
Whenever a lawyer communicates with a client by e-mail, the lawyer must first 
consider whether, given the client’s situation, there is a significant risk that 
third parties will have access to the communications.  If so, the lawyer must 
take reasonable care to protect the confidentiality of the communications by 
giving appropriately tailored advice to the client.57 
III. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON LAWYER’S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 
Multiple rules of professional conduct are implicated by the use of social 
media.  A lawyer’s ethical obligations may be affected as a result of a client’s 
use of social media or the lawyer’s own use of social media.  Consequently, 
multiple state bar associations have begun to issue guidance on the ways in 
which lawyers’ ethical obligations apply to the use of social media. 
A. A Client’s Use of Social Media 
A client’s use of social media may affect the attorney–client privilege in a 
different way than the client’s use of employer e-mail.  In contrast to the 
potential for the attorney–client privilege not to attach in the latter instance 
(where a client uses an employer’s computer or e-mail system to send or 
receive electronic communications with an attorney), a client’s use of social 
media or other forms of online communication create the potential for the 
attorney–client privilege to be waived with respect to communications in 
which the privilege has previously attached.58  Use of social media may also 
provide ammunition to a party’s opponent, because of a client’s 
misunderstanding about the level of confidentiality of the client’s online 
communications and their legal ramifications.59 
In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,60 comments posted by the plaintiff on a 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2010) (“A party may not attempt to explain an apparent admission [posted on a 
social media outlet] as a misinterpretation of a conversation with counsel, and then deny the opposing 
party on the basis of privilege access to the very conversations at issue.”) enforcing No. C-0703783 JF 
(PVT), 2010 WL 4286329 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010). 
 59. See id. (“When a client reveals to a third party that something is ‘what my lawyer thinks,’ she 
cannot avoid discovery on the basis that the communication was confidential.”). 
 60. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-CV-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099 (N.D. Cal. 
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blog regarding certain communications with her counsel constituted waiver 
of the attorney–client privilege as to those communications.61  There, 
Stephanie Lenz (Ms. Lenz) sued Universal Music Corporation (Universal) 
after the website YouTube complied with a takedown notice sent to it by 
Universal.62  The takedown notice alleged that a home video, uploaded to 
YouTube by Ms. Lenz, infringed on Universal’s copyright in the Prince song 
Let’s Go Crazy.63  Thereafter, Ms. Lenz sued Universal, alleging that 
Universal knowingly misrepresented that her video infringed upon 
Universal’s copyright.64  In response to Ms. Lenz making comments on her 
blog, in e-mails, and in electronic “chats” with friends, as well as statements 
to reporters, Universal moved to compel discovery relating to the 
conversations that Ms. Lenz discussed.65  One of Ms. Lenz’s 
communications to a friend stated that Ms. Lenz’s counsel was “very, very 
interested in the case” and “is pretty well salivating over getting their teeth 
into [Universal].”66  Ms. Lenz also wrote to her mother that her counsel 
planned a “publicity blitz and/or lawsuit against Universal.”67  Universal 
contended that Ms. Lenz’s communications with third parties revealed that 
her motivations for filing the lawsuit were to give her attorneys an 
opportunity to “get [] their teeth into [Universal],” and not to vindicate her 
First Amendment rights.68  Ms. Lenz countered that the comments only 
revealed information regarding her attorneys’ motives for representing her 
pro bono, not her own motivations for filing suit.69  The magistrate judge 
disagreed with Ms. Lenz and found that her communications related to the 
substance of her conversations with counsel.70  The magistrate, therefore, 
determined the attorney–client privilege had been waived and ordered 
further discovery regarding Ms. Lenz’s communications, a determination 
that the district court affirmed.71 
 
Nov. 17, 2010), enforcing No. C 07-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4286329 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010). 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at *3. 
 70. See id. at *2 (citing Judge Trumbell’s decision that Universal is owed further discovery 
concerning those attorney–client conversations since Lenz’s communication to third parties revealed 
the actual substance of attorney–client discourse).  
 71. See id. (upholding the court’s order granting defendant’s motion to compel production of 
privileged testimony). 
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In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.,72 Bill R. McMillen, Sr. 
(Mr. McMillen) filed suit to recover damages for injuries sustained during a 
cool down lap at a stock car race.73  Defendant, Hummingbird Speedway, 
Inc. (Hummingbird) asked Mr. McMillen, in an interrogatory, whether he 
belonged to any social networking websites, and if so, to provide his user 
name and password to such websites.74  Mr. McMillen responded by stating 
that he belonged to Facebook and MySpace but that he would not provide 
his login credentials.75  Hummingbird and the other defendants filed a 
motion to compel after their review of the public portions of 
Mr. McMillen’s Facebook page revealed Mr. McMillen had made comments 
about a fishing trip and his attendance at the Daytona 500 race.76  
Defendants contended such comments on the publicly-accessible portion 
of Mr. McMillen’s Facebook page provided cause to believe that the non-
publicly accessible portions of Mr. McMillen’s social media accounts might 
contain additional evidence relevant to Mr. McMillen’s claim for damages.77  
Mr. McMillen argued that communications shared with one’s private friends 
on social media are confidential and should be protected from disclosure.78  
The court determined while each website at issue provided a certain level of 
privacy by allowing users the opportunity to choose which posts are public 
and which are shared only with identified persons, “their terms and privacy 
policies should dispel any notion that information one chooses to share, 
even if only with one friend, will not be disclosed to anybody else.”79  Users 
are put on notice that their communications may be disseminated by those 
users with whom a post is shared.80  Additionally, the operators of social 
networking websites have access to each post.81  Thus, “[w]ithout more, the 
complete access afforded to the Facebook and MySpace operators defeats 
McMillen’s proposition that his communications are confidential [and t]he 
law does not even protect otherwise privileged communications made in the 
 
 72. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Com. 
Pl. Sept. 9, 2010).   
 73. Id. at *1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77.  Id. at *1–2. 
 78. Id. at *2. 
 79. Id. at *3–4. 
 80. Id. at *4.  See generally Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016).  
 81. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *4–5 
(Pa. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010). 
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presence of third parties.”82  Therefore, the court concluded that Facebook 
and MySpace users have consented to their posts being reviewed by a third 
party, the site operators, which is “wholly incommensurate with a claim of 
confidentiality.”83  Because the public portions of Mr. McMillen’s social 
media revealed content suggesting that Mr. McMillen may have exaggerated 
his injuries, it was reasonable to assume that the private portions might 
contain additional information relevant to the defendants’ defense.84  
Accordingly, the court ordered Mr. McMillen to provide to defense counsel 
his user names and passwords, and told him to not take any steps to delete 
or alter information on his Facebook and MySpace accounts.85 
Not surprisingly, the risks that social media might present to a client’s 
case, such as what occurred in McMillen, has caused state bar associations to 
examine attorneys’ ethical obligations regarding a client’s use of social 
media.  The Pennsylvania Bar Association has concluded that competent 
representation, pursuant to the Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.1 of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct generally requires a lawyer to “advise 
clients about the content of their social media accounts, including privacy 
issues, as well as their clients’ obligation to preserve information that may 
be relevant to their legal disputes.”86  Further, it is reasonable to expect that 
opposing counsel will monitor a client’s use of social media and, therefore, 
it may be appropriate to track one’s own client in order to stay informed of 
potential developments in a case.87 
With respect to the advice a lawyer may provide to a client regarding the 
client’s use of social media, bar associations that have examined the topic 
have generally concluded that a lawyer may advise a client to change social 
media privacy settings and may also advise a client regarding what content 
should be made private or be removed from the client’s social media 
pages.88  The Florida Bar Association has even concluded a lawyer may 
 
 82. Id. at *5. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at *6. 
 85. Id. at *8. 
 86. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014) 
(indicating a lawyer’s duty includes  advising clients about the content of their social media activity as 
it relates to privacy and preservation thereof, especially with regard to legal disputes); see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (discussing a lawyer’s duty to provide 
competent advice to clients). 
 87. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014). 
 88. See id. (confirming a lawyer may ethically advise a client to modify privacy settings on social 
media platforms, and remove content provided there is no violation of statutes, rules, or common law 
relating to evidence preservation); see also Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 14-1 (2015) 
(protecting lawyers’ abilities within the law to advise clients to maximize privacy settings on their social 
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advise a client to remove content from the client’s social media that is 
relevant to a foreseeable judicial proceeding.89  However, a lawyer may only 
provide such advice if the information or data to be removed is preserved.90  
When it is permissible for a lawyer to counsel a client to remove certain 
information from social media, the Philadelphia Bar Association has warned 
that the lawyer must also “take appropriate action to preserve the 
information in the event it should prove to be relevant and discoverable.”91 
Additionally, ethics opinions have determined that “[a] [lawyer] may not 
advise a client to post false or misleading [content].”92  Also, a lawyer may 
not offer evidence of social media content in a judicial proceeding that the 
lawyer knows is false.93  Doing so violates Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from “mak[ing] false 
statement[s] of material fact or law.”94 
B. A Lawyer’s Use of Social Media 
The pervasiveness of social media in recent years has sparked ethics 
opinions to address not only the advice lawyers should provide to clients 
regarding social media use, but also the permissible ways in which attorneys 
may use social media in their own practices.  Social media websites have 
been described as having become “indispensable tools used by legal 
professionals and those with whom they communicate.”95  The rapid 
growth of social media has even prompted the Commercial and Federal 
 
media platforms and to remove content where a duty to preserve evidence under law does not exist); 
accord N.Y. Cnty. Lawyer Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 745 (2013) (clarifying an attorney’s 
competent duty to advise clients concerning social media privacy settings, and permitting lawyers to 
advise clients against posting certain content on public and/or private pages and whether content may 
be removed, provided that there is no violation of rules or substantive law regarding evidence 
preservation). 
 89. See Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 14-1 (2015). 
 90. Id. (“The [Florida Bar] is of the opinion that if the inquirer does so, the social media 
information or data must be preserved if the information or data is known by the inquirer or reasonably 
should be known by the inquirer to be relevant to the reasonably foreseeable proceeding.”). 
 91. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2014-5 (2014).   
 92. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014) 
(“[A]n attorney may not advise a client to post false or misleading information on a social networking 
website; nor may an attorney offer evidence from a social networking website that the attorney knows 
is false.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (enforcing Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); accord MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. B. ASS’N 2016) (proscribing lawyers from knowingly falsifying 
information to third persons). 
 95. James M. Wicks et al., Social Media Ethics Guidelines, COM. & FED. LITIG. SEC., N.Y. ST. B. 
ASS’N 1 (Updated June, 9 2015), http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/
Com_Fed_PDFs/Social_Media_Ethics_Guidelines.html.   
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Litigation Section of the New York State Bar Association to recommend a 
useful set of guidelines regarding the ethical implications of a lawyer’s use 
of social media.96 
As part of its mandate to update the ABA Model Rules in light of 
technological changes, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 focused on 
rules relating to attorney advertising, a topic commonly implicated by a 
lawyer’s use of social media.97  As a result, the Commission recommended 
certain changes to the comments of Rule 7.2 of the Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA.98  Specifically, the 
Commission proposed adding “‘the Internet, and other forms of electronic 
communication’” to the list of ‘powerful media’” found in the comments to 
Rule 7.2.99  Comment 3 to ABA Model Rule 7.2 now reads as follows: 
Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation 
and subjective judgment.  Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions 
against television and other forms of advertising, against advertising going 
beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against “undignified” advertising.  
Television, the Internet, and other forms of electronic communication are 
now among the most powerful media for getting information to the public, 
particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television, 
Internet, and other forms of electronic advertising, therefore, would impede 
the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public.  
Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and 
assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the 
public would regard as relevant.  But see Rule 7.3(a) for the prohibition against 
a solicitation through a real-time electronic exchange initiated by the 
lawyer.100 
Although perhaps a minor clarification, the inclusion of the phrase “the 
Internet, and other forms of communication” in Comment 3 has been 
noted by ethics opinions which have concluded that attorneys may advertise 
using social media, in compliance with Rule 7.2.101  For instance, the West 
Virginia Bar Disciplinary Board concluded that social media advertising was 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 2, at 160 (discussing how social media innovations caused 
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to conduct an in-depth study of attorney advertising under the 
ABA Model Rules).   
 98. See id. (referencing comment three on Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct).   
 99. Id. at 161 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)).   
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 101 Id.  
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permissible, pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2, 
because social media advertising “constitutes advertising via the Internet 
and/or electronic communication.”102  In support of its conclusion, the 
West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board stated: 
Indeed, Comment [3] to Rule 7.2 pointedly notes that “[t]elevision, the 
Internet, and other forms of electronic communication are now among the 
most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly 
persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television, Internet, and 
other forms of electronic advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of 
information about legal services to many sectors of the public.”103 
Therefore, attorneys may generally use social media as a platform to 
advertise their services, but must, of course, do so in compliance with the 
rules regarding attorney advertising.104  For instance, a lawyer “shall not 
advertise areas of practice under headings in social media platforms that 
include the terms ‘specialist,’ unless the lawyer is certified by the appropriate 
accrediting body in the particular area.”105  The New York City Bar recently 
adopted a five-element test to determine whether a lawyer’s LinkedIn profile 
or other social media content constituted attorney advertising.106  The Bar 
concluded that a LinkedIn profile constitutes attorney advertising if the 
following criteria are met: (1) the LinkedIn content is a communication 
made by or on behalf of the lawyer; (2) the primary purpose of the content 
is to attract new clients to retain the lawyer for pecuniary gain; (3) the 
content relates to the legal services offered by the lawyer; (4) the content is 
intended to be viewed by potential new clients; and (5) the content does not 
fall within any recognized exception to the definition of attorney 
advertising.107 
Social media has become a popular and effective way for lawyers to 
market their services.  However, the nature of social media typically allows 
not only the lawyer/account holder, but also third parties, to post 
information on the lawyer’s social media presence.  For example, certain 
social media websites allow users to submit reviews, recommendations or 
 
 102. W. Va. Law. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2015-02 (2015). 
 103. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 104. W. Va. Law. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2015-02 (2015). 
 105. Wicks et al., supra note 95, at 7. 
 106. See N.Y. City B. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2015-7 (2015) (“An attorney’s individual 
LinkedIn profile or other content constitutes attorney advertising only if it meets all five of the 
following criteria . . . .”). 
 107. Id. 
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endorsements of a lawyer’s services.108  The ability of third parties to post 
content to a lawyer’s social media page could lead to violations of the 
lawyer’s ethical duties if the lawyer is not vigilant in monitoring what others 
post on the lawyer’s behalf.  For example, Rule 8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer 
from “[engaging] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”109   Accordingly, content posted by lawyers on their 
social media pages must be true, accurate, and non-misleading.  Ethics 
opinions have concluded that lawyers also have an obligation to ensure that 
content posted to their social media pages by others meets this high standard 
set for lawyers.  For example, the Pennsylvania Bar Association determined 
that a lawyer should: “(1) monitor his or her social [media] websites, 
(2) . . . verify the accuracy of any information posted, and (3) . . . remove or 
correct any inaccurate endorsements.”110 
While social media provides a marketing platform to feature 
endorsements or recommendations of a lawyer’s services, it may also 
provide a platform for unsatisfied clients to post content that could harm a 
lawyer’s reputation or practice.  Lawyers who come across a negative review, 
while monitoring their social media presence, may feel inclined to respond 
to protect their practice from the damage such a review might cause.  
However, responding in-kind could cause attorneys to reveal confidential 
information, in violation of Rule 1.6.111  In fact, lawyers have been 
disciplined for doing so. 
For example, a proposed mild form of discipline for one lawyer was 
rejected as too lenient by the Supreme Court of Georgia, where the lawyer 
had posted personal and confidential information about a former client in 
response to a negative review.112  In her petition for voluntary discipline, 
Ms. Skinner admitted to “[violating] Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of 
Professional Conduct” and requested the mildest form of punishment 
available in Georgia for doing so.113  The court rejected Ms. Skinner’s 
request.114  Following rejection of Ms. Skinner’s petition, a special master 
 
 108. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014) 
(noting certain social networking cites permit clients to review, recommend, or endorse attorneys). 
 109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (Am. B. Ass’n 1983). 
 110. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014). 
 111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016) (stating attorneys 
cannot reveal a client’s information except in specific circumstances). 
 112. See In re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 171–73 (Ga. 2013) (per curiam) (rejecting the mildest form 
of discipline for an attorney that posted personal and confidential information about a former client 
even though the post was in self defense). 
 113. Id. at 172–73. 
 114. Id. at 173. 
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conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Ms. Skinner had 
violated Rule 1.6 among other rules.115  After a client whom Ms. Skinner 
was representing in an uncontested divorce discharged Ms. Skinner and 
hired new counsel, the client posted negative reviews of Ms. Skinner on 
three consumer Internet pages.116  Ms. Skinner subsequently posted a 
response to the client’s reviews, which “contained personal and confidential 
information about her former client that Skinner had obtained in the course 
of her representation of the client.”117  “In particular, Skinner identified the 
client by name, identified the employer of the client, stated how much the 
client had paid Skinner, identified the county in which the divorce had been 
filed, and stated that the client had a boyfriend.”118  After noting there were 
significant mitigating circumstances involving personal problems 
experienced by Ms. Skinner during her representation of the client and at 
the time she posted the confidential information, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia ordered Ms. Skinner to receive a public reprimand and to consult 
with the state’s law practice management services.119 
The Hearing Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 
Commission similarly reprimanded an attorney who responded 
inappropriately to a negative online client review.120  Ms. Tsamis had 
represented a client in securing unemployment benefits from the client’s 
former employer.121  The client terminated Ms. Tsamis’ representation after 
the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied the client’s claim 
for unemployment benefits and, thereafter, posted a negative review of 
Ms. Tsamis on the legal referral website AVVO.122  Although AVVO 
removed the client’s post, the client subsequently posted a second negative 
review to which Ms. Tsamis replied.123  Ms. Tsamis’ response “contained 
information relating to her representation of [the client] and exceeded what 
was necessary to respond to [the client’s] accusations.”124 
Bar associations have weighed in on the applicability of Rule 1.6’s self-
defense exception to a lawyer’s response to online client reviews.  Although 
 
 115. In re Skinner, 758 S.E.2d 788, 788 (Ga. 2014).   
 116. Id. at 789. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 790. 
 120. See Tsamis, Comm. File No. 2013PR00095 (Ill. 2013), https://www.iardc.org/rd_database/
rulesdecisions.html. (reprimanding an attorney for inappropriately revealing information online about 
a former client). 
 121. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 122. Id. at ¶ 7–8. 
 123. Id. at ¶ 9–10. 
 124. Id. at ¶ 10. 
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Rule 1.6 allows a lawyer to reveal information otherwise prohibited “to 
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and the client . . . or to respond to allegations in any a proceeding 
concerning the lawyer’s representation,”125 the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association concluded that “a negative online client review is not a 
circumstance that invokes the self-defense exception.”126  The Bar 
Association of San Francisco similarly concluded that the self-defense 
exception is inapplicable in the context of responding to a negative review.  
That opinion concluded with: 
Attorney is not barred from responding generally to an online review by a 
former client where the former client’s matter has concluded.  Although the 
residual duty of loyalty owed to the former client does not prohibit a response, 
Attorney’s on-going duty of confidentiality prohibits Attorney from disclosing 
any confidential information about the prior representation absent the former 
client’s informed consent or a waiver of confidentiality.  California’s statutory 
self-defense exception, as interpreted by California case law, has been limited 
in application to claims by a client (against or about an attorney), or by an 
attorney against a client, in the context of a formal or imminent legal 
proceeding.  Even in those circumstances where disclosure of otherwise 
confidential information is permitted, the disclosure must be narrowly tailored 
to the issues raised by the former client.  If the matter previously handled for 
the former client has not concluded, it may be inappropriate under the 
circumstances for Attorney to provide any substantive response in the online 
forum, even one that does not disclose confidential information.127 
The Social Media Ethics Guidelines of the Commercial and Federal 
Litigation Section of the New York State Bar Association issued the 
following guideline: 
Where a lawyer learns that a client has posted a review of her services on a 
website or on social media, if the lawyer chooses to respond to the client’s 
online review, the lawyer shall not reveal confidential information relating to 
the representation of the client.  This prohibition applies, even if the lawyer is 
attempting to respond to unflattering comments posted by the client.128 
To aid lawyers in responding to an unflattering post, the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association has proposed a suggested response that a lawyer may ethically 
 
 125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 126. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).   
 127. The B. Ass’n of S.F. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2014-1 (2014).   
 128. Wicks et al., supra note 95, at 23.   
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post in response to a negative review.  That response is as follows: 
A lawyer’s duty to keep client confidences has few exceptions and in an 
abundance of caution I do not feel at liberty to respond in a point-by-point 
fashion in this forum.  Suffice it to say that I do not believe that the post 
presents a fair and accurate picture of the events.129 
Another rule implicated by a lawyer’s use of social media is Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from communicating 
with a party represented by counsel, unless the lawyer has been granted 
permission by that party’s counsel.130  Ethics opinions analyzing the prior 
consent provision of state analogs of Rule 4.2 have interpreted that 
provision strictly.  For example, the New York City Bar and North Carolina 
State Bar have each concluded that Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from sending 
a “reply all” e-mail in response to an e-mail sent by opposing counsel, where 
opposing counsel copied his or her client on the original e-mail, unless 
opposing counsel has provided express or implied consent to do so.131 
In the context of social media, the sending of a “friend request” has been 
interpreted to constitute a communication in violation of Rule 4.2, where a 
represented party’s counsel has not consented to the request.132  However, 
accessing the public portion of a represented party’s social media website 
has generally been found to be permissible.133  Accessing the public portion 
of a party’s social media website, which is that portion that is available to 
anyone who is a member of that particular social media network, is 
analogous to “obtaining information that is available in publicly accessible 
online or print media, or through a subscription research service such as 
Nexis or Factiva, and that is plainly permitted.”134  Where a lawyer attempts 
to access the private portions of a party’s social media, an ethical boundary 
 
 129. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-200 (2014).  
 130 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“In representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer 
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”). . 
 131. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 7 (2013) (interpreting Rule 4.2 to prohibit an attorney from 
responding to opposing counsel’s e-mail via “reply all” if opposing counsel has copied his client on the 
e-mail and has not consented to his client being contacted); see also  The Ass’n of the B. of the City of 
N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2009-1 (2009) (concluding absent consent, an 
attorney cannot respond to opposing counsel’s e-mail using “reply all” if opposing counsel’s client was 
copied on the original e-mail). 
 132. See, e.g., Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm.., Formal Op. 2014-300 
(2014) (“[T]his Committee also finds that ‘friending’ a represented party violates Rule 4.2.”).   
 133. Id.; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843 (2010). 
 134. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843 (2010). 
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may be crossed, because accessing the private portion entails sending a 
request, i.e. a communication, to the party, which is, of course, prohibited if 
that party is represented.135 
On the other hand, where a party is unrepresented, sending a “friend 
request” does not implicate Rule 4.2.  However, lawyers must remain 
mindful of their obligations in dealing with unrepresented parties, when 
sending a “friend request” to a person not represented by counsel.  Rule 4.3 
requires that “a lawyer . . . not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested,” 
when dealing with an unrepresented party on behalf of a client, and to 
“make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding” the 
unrepresented person may have regarding the lawyer’s role.136  While 
communicating with an unrepresented party through social media is not 
prohibited by the ban on lawyer contact with represented parties, the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association concluded that an “attorney must use his or 
her own name and state the purpose for contacting the individual” to 
comply with the attorney’s ethical obligations in dealing with an 
unrepresented party.137  Further, the lawyer must expressly state the 
purpose of the request, because failing to do so would be implying that the 
lawyer is disinterested, according to the opinion, in violation of Rule 4.3.138 
While a number of bar associations have reached the conclusion that a 
lawyer must state the purpose for a request to access the private portions of 
an unrepresented party’s social media pages, as the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association did, not all bar associations have reached this conclusion.  The 
Oregon State Bar determined that a request for access to the private portion 
of an unrepresented party’s social media page “does not in and of itself make 
a representation about the [l]awyer’s role.”139  Therefore, according to the 
Oregon State Bar, the failure of the lawyer to state the purpose for a request 
to access private social media pages of an unrepresented party does not 
imply that the lawyer is disinterested.  “On the contrary, it suggests that [the] 
[l]awyer is interested in the person’s social networking information, although 
 
 135. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014) 
(“[A] request to access the represented party’s private page is a prohibited communication under 
Rule 4.2.”). 
 136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“In dealing on behalf 
of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the 
lawyer is disinterested.  When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented 
person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
correct the misunderstanding.”). 
 137. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).   
 138. Id. 
 139. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics. Comm., Formal Op. 2013-189 (2013).   
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for an unidentified purpose.”140  Further, because the social media account 
holder has control over which persons are granted access to information 
protected by privacy settings, “the holder’s failure to inquire further about 
the identity or purpose of unknown access requestors is not the equivalent 
of misunderstanding Lawyer’s role in the matter.”141  Thus, according to 
the Oregon State Bar, a lawyer is not required to state the purpose of a 
request to access the private portions of an unrepresented party’s social 
media pages.  However, if the party asks for additional information or the 
“[l]awyer has some other reason to believe that the person misunderstands 
[the lawyer’s] role, [then the] [l]awyer must provide the additional 
information or withdraw the request.”142  Accordingly, there is a split of 
authority regarding an attorney’s ethical obligations when contacting an 
unrepresented party, in an attempt to gain access to that party’s private social 
media pages. 
In contrast with the standards for contacting a represented or 
unrepresented party, ethics opinions have stated it is never permissible for 
a lawyer to send a request to gain access to the private portions of a juror’s 
or potential juror’s social media pages.143  Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.5 states a lawyer shall not “seek to influence a judge, juror, 
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law” or 
“communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless 
authorized to do so by law or court order.”144  The ABA has concluded 
that a lawyer’s review of the public portions of a juror or potential juror’s 
social media presence does not constitute a violation of Model Rule 3.5.145  
However, a request to view private portions of a juror or prospective juror’s 
social media pages is considered “a communication to a juror asking the 
juror for information that the juror has not made public.”146  “This would 
be the type of ex parte communication prohibited by Model 
Rule 3.5(b).”147  Therefore, although a lawyer may, under certain 
circumstances, request access to a represented or unrepresented party’s 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. ABA Comm’n On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014) (“[A] lawyer may 
passively review a juror’s public presence on the Internet, but may not communicate with a juror.  
Requesting access to a private area on a juror’s [social media page] is communication within this 
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 144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(a)–(b) (AM. B. ASS’N 2016). 
 145. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014).   
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 147. Id. 
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private social media presence, a lawyer “may not . . . request . . . access [to] 
the private portions of . . . a juror’s social networking website.”148 
 C. Online Communications with Prospective Clients 
The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 also proposed—and the ABA 
adopted—revisions to Rule 1.18 (duties to a prospective client) to clarify the 
applicability of that rule to online communications.149  One of the 
Commission’s recommendations was to define a “prospective client” as one 
who has “a reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to consider 
forming a client–lawyer relationship.”150  The Commission believed this 
proposed definition of a “prospective client” made the applicable standard 
“more capable of application to electronic communications.”151  Although 
Rule 1.18 does not currently define a prospective client in those terms,152 
Comment 2 to Rule 1.18 now includes the following example: 
[A] consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer 
in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education, 
experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal 
information of general interest.  Such a person communicates information 
unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is 
willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is 
thus not a “prospective client.”153 
Thus, the Commission’s recommendation regarding language that more 
accurately applies to electronic communications provides guidance on the 
applicability of Rule 1.18 to social media and other electronic 
communications.  Indeed, in the age of social media, lawyers should be 
aware that participation in online discussions “may trigger duties owed to 
prospective clients, including a risk of disqualification from representation 
of an adverse party, fiduciary obligations, and malpractice liability (as well as 
 
 148. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014) 
(stating an attorney may access the public information of a juror’s social networking site, but a request 
or attempt to access the private portions of the site would be a violation of Rule 3.5(b)). 
 149. Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Press Release, A.B.A., ABA President Carolyn 
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 152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. B. ASS’N 2016) (“A person who 
consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a 
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the possible unauthorized practice of law where an attorney provides legal 
advice in a jurisdiction in which he or she is not licensed).”154   
IV. CLIENT CONFIDENCES IN THE AGE OF THE CLOUD 
One of the most significant technological advancements that implicates a 
lawyer’s obligation to protect client confidences is the use of cloud 
computing.  Cloud computing is described as a “sophisticated form of 
remote electronic data storage on the internet.”155  “Unlike traditional 
methods that maintain data on a computer or server at a law office or other 
place of business, data stored ‘in the cloud’ is kept on large servers located 
elsewhere and maintained by a vendor.”156  Use of cloud computing can 
provide lawyers with increased access to client data and provide clients with 
increased access to their files over the Internet.157  Its use may also protect 
against loss of data, where information is duplicated across multiple servers 
and regular backups are performed.158 
Not all services commonly or even fairly described as “cloud computing” 
raise the same kind of risks for lawyers, because the phrase mostly describes 
access by way of the Internet to a remote server on which data and 
applications may be stored, without regard to who owns or controls the 
servers and the links to it.  No matter who owns the technology, however, 
the lawyer or law firm that stores client confidential information on it has 
an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect its confidentiality.159  Still, 
where the lawyer or law firm “buys” the service of cloud storage of 
confidential data on technology that the lawyer does not directly own or 
control, as is the case in many “cloud” services, the risks are different, and 
the lawyer’s obligations are different.160  The main risk affecting a lawyer’s 
duty to protect client confidences in this context arises from the fact that 
the information the lawyer is obligated to protect is not under the direct 
 
 154. Merri A. Baldwin, Ethical and Liability Risks Posed by Lawyers’ Use of Social Media, A.B.A. 
(July 28, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/articles/summer
2011-liability-social-media.html. 
 155. Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n., Op. 2010-02 (2010) (quoting Richard Acello, Get Your 
Head in the Cloud, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 28, 28–29).   
 156. Id. (quoting Richard Acello, Get Your Head in the Cloud, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 28, 28).  
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 158. See Meghan C. Lewallen, Note, Cloud Computing: A Laywer’s Ethical Duty to Act with Reasonable 
Care When Storing Client Confidences “In the Cloud,” 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2013) (discussing 
the benefits of cloud computing and how regular back-up and duplication of information across several 
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 160. Id. at 1141–43 (discussing risks of third party cloud services). 
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control of the lawyer, but, instead, is stored on a vendor’s server.161  The 
nature of cloud computing also means that an unauthorized third-party has 
the potential to gain access to the vendor’s server and, thus, confidential 
client information.162  The risk that information subject to a lawyer’s 
Rule 1.6 obligation to protect will be accessed by unauthorized third-parties 
is present not only in the context of cloud computing, but also by a lawyer’s 
use of laptops, smartphones, tablets, and other modern technology that a 
lawyer may utilize in their practice. 
The reality of hacking and the risk it presents in the practice of law has 
led to the addition of a new subpart (c) to Rule 1.6, which now provides that 
“[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating 
to the representation of a client.”163  Additionally, the Comment to Rule 1.6 
now provides guidance regarding reasonableness in the context of steps 
taken to prevent unauthorized access to client information.  Revised 
Comment [18] reads: 
Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information 
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third 
parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or 
other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who 
are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.  See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.  The 
unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, 
information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a 
violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent 
the access or disclosure.  Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the 
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional 
safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the 
difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the 
safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by 
making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).  
A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not 
required by this Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures 
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that would otherwise be required by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be 
required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order 
to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data 
privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or 
unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these 
Rules.  For a lawyer’s duties when sharing information with nonlawyers 
outside the lawyer’s own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments [3]-[4].164 
Revised Comment 19 now reads: 
When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the 
representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to 
prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.  
This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security 
measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions.  
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s 
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and 
the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or 
by a confidentiality agreement.  A client may require the lawyer to implement 
special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed 
consent to the use of means of communication that would otherwise be 
prohibited by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional 
steps in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that 
govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.165 
Although cloud computing presents the risk that confidential client 
information will be accessed by third-parties, ethics opinions that have 
examined the issue have not deemed the risk severe enough to warrant a 
prohibition of cloud computing in the practice of law.  In fact, the use of 
cloud computing has generally been approved, subject to appropriate 
precautions being put in place.166 In 2006, the Nevada State Bar concluded 
that an attorney “may use an outside agency to store confidential client 
information in electronic forms, and on hardware located outside the 
attorney’s direct supervision and control, so long as the attorney observes 
the usual obligations applicable to such arrangements for third party storage 
 
 164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, cmt. 18 (AM. B. ASS’N 2016).  
 165. See id. r. 1.6, cmt. 19. 
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extensive list of ethics opinions addressing the use of cloud computing. 
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services.”167  In 2010, the Alabama Disciplinary Commission agreed, 
stating that “a lawyer may use ‘cloud computing’ or third-party providers to 
store client data provided that the attorney exercises reasonable care in 
doing so.”168  That duty of reasonable care requires a lawyer “to become 
knowledgeable about how the provider will handle the storage and security 
of the data being stored and to reasonably ensure that the provider will abide 
by a confidentiality agreement in handling the data.”169  “Additionally, 
because technology is constantly evolving, the lawyer will have a continuing 
duty to stay abreast of appropriate security safeguards that should be 
employed by the lawyer and the third-party provider.”170 
The Arizona State Bar has similarly concluded that a lawyer “should 
periodically review security measures in place to ensure that they still 
reasonably protect the security and confidentiality of the clients’ documents 
and information.”171  The Arizona opinion also provided examples of steps 
a lawyer should take to comply with the duty of reasonable care, which 
included the use of “firewalls, password protection schemes, encryption, 
anti-virus measures, etc.”172  However, the duty of reasonable care “does 
not require a guarantee that the system will be invulnerable to unauthorized 
access.”173  Nonetheless, the Arizona Bar quoted with approval a New 
Jersey ethics opinion, which stated that a lawyer “is required to exercise 
sound professional judgment on the steps necessary to secure client 
confidences against foreseeable attempts at unauthorized access.”174  The 
duty of reasonable care espoused by these and other state ethics opinions 
has been described as follows: 
In short, a lawyer cannot take the “ostrich” approach of hiding his head in the 
sand and hoping that his office or firm will not suffer a data breach that 
compromises client information.  Lawyers must implement administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards to meet their obligation to make reasonable 
efforts to protect client information.175 
State bars have further weighed in on what techniques are appropriate to 
implement to protect against data breaches and inadvertent disclosures of 
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client information.  For example, the Virginia State Bar concluded that the 
proper level of care requires that a lawyer “examine the third party 
provider’s use of technology and terms of service in order to know whether 
it adequately safeguards client information, and if the lawyer is not able to 
make this assessment on her own, she will have to consult with someone 
qualified to make that determination.”176  The Maine Board of Bar 
Overseers went further and provided a list of internal policies and 
procedures that a lawyer should implement to satisfy their obligations under 
the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct and a separate list of safeguards 
that should be adopted to deal with a third-party cloud vendor.177  The 
internal policies and procedures suggested by the Maine Board are as 
follows: 
1. backing up data to allow the firm to restore data that has been lost, 
corrupted, or accidentally deleted; 
2. installing a firewall to limit access to the firm’s network; 
3. limiting information that is provided to others to what is required, needed, 
or requested; 
4. avoiding inadvertent disclosure of information; 
5. verifying the identity of individuals to whom the attorney provides 
confidential information; 
6. refusing to disclose confidential information to unauthorized individuals 
(including family members and friends) without client permission; 
7. protecting electronic records containing confidential data, including 
backups, by encrypting the confidential data; 
8. implementing electronic audit trail procedures to monitor who is 
accessing the data; 
9. creating plans to address security breaches, including the identification of 
persons to be notified about any known or suspected security breach 
involving confidential data; and 
10. educating and training employees of the firm who use cloud computing 
to abide by all end-user security measures, including, but not limited to, 
the creation of strong passwords and the regular replacement of 
passwords.178 
The Maine Board also concluded that a lawyer should ensure the vendor of 
cloud computing services or hardware: 
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1. explicitly agrees that it has no ownership or security interest in the data; 
2. has an enforceable obligation to preserve security; 
3. will notify the lawyer if requested to produce data to a third party, and 
provide the lawyer with the ability to respond to the request before the 
provider produces the requested information; 
4. has technology built to withstand a reasonably foreseeable attempt to 
infiltrate data, including penetration testing; 
5. provides the firm with the right to audit the provider’s security procedures 
and to obtain copies of any security audits performed; 
6. will host the firm’s data only within a specified geographic area.  If the 
date is hosted outside of the United States, the law firm must determine 
that the hosting jurisdiction has privacy laws, data security laws, and 
protections against unlawful search and seizure that are as rigorous as 
those of the United States and Maine; 
7. provides the ability for the law firm, on demand, to get data from the 
vendor’s or third-party data hosting company’s servers for the firm’s own 
use or for in-house backup.179 
The Massachusetts Bar Association has also weighed in on cloud 
computing.  Following its review of reasonable measures that should be 
taken to protect confidential client information, the Massachusetts Bar 
reminded lawyers that, regardless of their choice to use cloud computing 
services, they remain “bound to follow an express instruction from [a] client 
that [their] confidential information not be stored or transmitted by . . . the 
Internet, and . . . should refrain from storing or transmitting particularly 
sensitive client information by means of the Internet without first seeking 
and obtaining the client’s express consent . . . .”180 
Prior to storing client information in the cloud, lawyers would be wise to 
consult the ABA’s compilation of ethics opinions regarding the use of cloud 
computing to locate that jurisdiction’s opinion regarding the appropriate 
steps to implement when using cloud computing.181 
V. CONCLUSION 
The introduction of new technology to the practice of law, such as social 
media and cloud computing, often provides lawyers with an increased 
opportunity to market their services and manage their practices more 
efficiently.  However, these technology developments may present new 
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ways for lawyers to run afoul of their ethical obligations.  Moreover, the 
applicable ethics rules are often outpaced by the technological 
advancements.  Thus, it is important for lawyers to be mindful of their 
existing ethical obligations in the context of new scenarios that may be 
presented by their use of new technologies. 
 
